Mendes v. R. – TCC: Taxpayer not entitled to GST/HST new housing rebate as property not acquired as a principal residence.

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Mendes v. The Queen (January 16, 2015 – 2015 TCC 11, Woods J.).

Précis: The taxpayer acquired title to a new housing property, lived there for 3 ½ months, moved to another property and sold the first 1 ½ months later. The taxpayer’s claim for a new housing GST rebate was denied and she appealed to the Tax Court. The Court was not satisfied by the taxpayer’s evidence that she acquired the first property with the intention of living there as a principal residence and dismissed the appeal.

Decision:  This is a decision dealing with the GST/HST new housing rebate under the Excise Tax Act. The matter arose out of the fact that the taxpayer and her spouse had acquired two residential properties in a fairly short period of time. The property at issue in this appeal was the first one acquired and was subsequently sold:

[9] In 2011, Ms. Mendes and her spouse acquired two newly-built residential properties near each other in Brampton, Ontario. One of the properties is the subject matter of this appeal. The other was the subject of a similar new housing rebate that was granted to Ms. Mendes’ spouse.

[10] Both of these transactions are relevant and are described below.

[11] On October 16, 2009, Ms. Mendes signed an agreement of purchase and sale in respect of a house to be built at 52 Balin Crescent, Brampton, Ontario (the “Balin Property”).

[12] On April 15, 2010, Ms. Mendes and her spouse, Maxim Mendes, signed an agreement of purchase and sale in respect of a house to be built at 32 Legendary Circle, Brampton, Ontario (the “Legendary Property”).

[13] On or around August 30, 2011, Mr. and Ms. Mendes took ownership of the Balin Property and moved in with their two children and Ms. Mendes’ parents.

[14] On November 2, 2011, the Balin Property was listed for lease.

[15] On or around December 13, 2011, Mr. Mendes, either alone or together with Ms. Mendes, took ownership of the Legendary Property and the family moved there from the Balin Property. One exhibit suggests that Mr. Mendes was the sole owner (Ex. A-2) and another suggests that they were co-owners (Ex. R‑4, Tab A). Nothing turns on this in this appeal.

[16] On December 19, 2011, the Balin Property was listed for sale.

[17] On January 16, 2012, a one year lease was entered into with respect to the Balin Property to commence March, 2012.

[18] On February 2, 2012, the Balin Property was sold.

[19] The Mendes family still resides at the Legendary Property.

The Court was simply not persuaded by Mrs. Mendes’ claim that she had originally intended to reside in the Balin Property but subsequently changed her plans:

[34] To a great extent, Ms. Mendes has attempted to establish her intention at the time of entering into the agreement of purchase and sale for the Balin Property by evidence that she actually moved into the Balin Property and had an unexpected reason to move shortly thereafter.

[35] I did not find this testimony to be convincing but this is not the end of the matter. Intention is to be determined at the time the agreement of purchase and sale was entered into. This was October 16, 2009.

[36] This date is approximately six months before the agreement was signed with respect to the Legendary Property. Accordingly, the requirement in s. 254(2)(b) would be satisfied if Ms. Mendes first had an intention to use the Balin Property as a primary residence and then changed this intention six months later when the agreement was signed with respect to the Legendary Property.

[37] Although this possibility is plausible, the evidence was not sufficiently reliable or detailed for me to be satisfied as to Ms. Mendes’ intention when the agreement was signed for the Balin Property.

[38] Ms. Mendes simply made brief statements as to her intention on the dates that the agreements of purchase and sale were signed for the Balin Property and Legendary Property. The evidence was simply not detailed enough to be convincing.

[39] For these reasons, I have concluded that the requirement in s. 254(2)(b) is not satisfied. The appeal will be dismissed.